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THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS. (Dennis J. Baker & Jeremy Horder eds., Cambridge
University Press, 2013)
The title for this review of a volume of essays written to commemorate the
criminal law scholarship of the late Glanville Williams (1911-1997) is the one
chosen by Tony Smith for the concluding chapter of the volume. The title given to
the collection-The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law-does not fully reflect
the content of the book. Some of the essays deal with matters relating directly to
the sanctity of life, but the majority of the chapters revisit other topics in the
criminal law which were of interest to Williams. These essays, admiring yet
sometimes critical of Williams' scholarship, prompt thoughts about the nature and
purpose of the academic study of Anglo-American criminal law at the present
time, thoughts to be aired briefly at the end of this review.
Before that and other things, something should be said about the stature that
Williams attained among practicing and academic English lawyers. The final post
that he held for many years up to his retirement was Rouse Ball Professor of
English Law at the University of Cambridge. The broad designation of this chair
shows the scholarly interests and achievements of Williams went far beyond the
criminal law. Had he not written anything at all about criminal law, he would still
have been a highly prominent legal academic on account of major publications in
the fields of contract, torts, public law, and jurisprudence.' Yet it is his work in
criminal law that is the most enduring part of his legacy, above all, Criminal Law:
The General Part.
2
Before the publication of The General Part, the study and the practice of
criminal law in England did not carry much intellectual kudos. In the words of the
legal historian Milsom:
The miserable history of crime in England can be shortly told. Nothing
worth-while was created. . . . The kind of discussion by which law
develops as an intellectual system is a luxury in the context of preserving
Emeritus Professor of Law, University College, London.
The biographical note of Peter Glazebrook, prepared for the proceedings of the British
Academy, is reproduced as chapter one of the volume under review, and provides a very well
informed appraisal of Glanville Williams, the man and his work. (P. 1.)
2 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (2d ed. 1961).
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elementary order.... The criminal law became segregated [from the rest
of the common law] as one of the dirty jobs for society.
3
Milsom's assessment was too severe, adopting the dismissive tone that some
legal scholars still use when discussing the criminal law. But there is far more than
a grain of truth in his appraisal. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the
sources of the substantive criminal law were scanty. The proceedings of the Star
Chamber left an account of the origins and development of incitement, conspiracy
and attempt.4 The records of jury trials left only details of indictment, general
issue and verdict, although a judge, at his discretion, could reserve a point of law
for a ruling from a bench of judges. Legal representation was available to
defendants in felony trials only as of 1836.' Appeals from a jury verdict were not
provided for until 1907 6 Before then, appeals were allowed from convictions only
for some summary offences. Unsurprisingly, there were few landmark cases until
well into the last century, and the substantive criminal law, such as it was,
consisted of a patchwork of legislation, some of considerable vintage, and the
meager body of appellate and reserved decisions. To some extent, these primary
sources were supplemented by some very influential extrajudicial writing about the
criminal law.7
In preparing his magnum opus, Williams studied in depth the criminal laws of
Anglophone jurisdictions, putting the cases and statutory materials worthy of
analysis in the best light and under appropriate rubrics, while making sharp
criticisms and formulating reform proposals for aspects of the criminal law found
unfit for purpose. For England and Wales, he produced a corpus of law to be
critiqued, developed, and improved. Though grounded in the sources, the General
Part was a creative work of doctrinal scholarship of the highest order. Despite the
efforts of Williams and other scholars, Milsom concluded his historical survey of
the criminal law with a glance at the present day (1982): "Only in very recent years
has much effort been made in England to systematize the criminal law at all levels,
and to state it in terms more appropriate than those left by medieval accident."8
This comment still has some sting even now in the light of the failure of England
and Wales to produce a criminal code. Yet, even at the time, his comment gave
less than their due to the growing sophistication of appellate judgments on the
substantive criminal law, and the growth of doctrinal and theoretical scholarship in
that field. Things have improved significantly in these regards since then.
3 S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 403 (2d ed. 1981).
4 WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 663.
5 Prisoners' Counsel Act, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 144 (U.K.).
6 Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, §§ 3, 4 (U.K.).
7 There is a significant literature on criminal law from the institutional writers Coke, Hale,
Hawkins, Foster, and East, and from Blackstone and Stephen. See (Pp. 330-32.)
8 MILSOM, supra note 3, at 428.
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Williams' work in the substantive criminal law remains a valuable point of
reference in the development of doctrine in criminal law.
Although a doctrinal scholar of the first rank, scholarship for the sake of
scholarship was not his primary goal. Above all, he wanted to make the criminal
law useful and humane as from a utilitarian perspective. After fulfilling the
obligations of his chair, practical engagement with the process of legal reform was
his first priority. (P. 330.) Though he achieved some successes in influencing and
shaping changes in the criminal law of England and Wales, it is his scholarship
that leaves the greatest mark. His current citation rate in appellate courts provokes
admiration and envy from those, such as your reviewer, who are still toiling in the
vineyard to less effect than Williams achieves posthumously.9
It is not possible to do full justice to all of the contributors to the volume. The
editors are to be congratulated on the prowess of the team of scholars recruited.
All of the essays can be read with profit by anyone with an interest in Anglo-
American criminal law. What follows is an attempt to capture and engage with the
major points of criticism concerning aspects of Williams' scholarship that arise in
these essays.
I. THE GENERAL PART
Although the break is not completely clean, many of the essays can be divided
into those dealing with aspects of what is often called the general part of the
criminal law and those where the predominate concern is with the sanctity of life.
This section will discuss the general part themes. It will be convenient to begin
with two essays which fall within the general part as Williams conceived it, but
which are more self-contained than other contributions.
A. Mental Disorder and Sexual Consent
John Stanton-Ife tackles a difficult issue: the legal regulation of the sex lives
of mentally disordered persons. The immediate concern is to protect a vulnerable
class of persons from harm and exploitation, but, in doing so, it is all too easy to
eliminate any form of sexual pleasure from the lives of persons who may possess a
full libido. An overprotective regime may limit their chances of forming
affectionate, long-term relationships and over-regiment their daily lives. English
law cleaves closely to protecting mentally disordered persons, leaving little scope
for sexual contact. It deploys the concept of "refusal-incapable" persons.', V will
be refusal-incapable if she lacks a sufficient understanding of the nature of the
sexual contact or the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the contact." Even
9 Joshua Dressier gives details of Williams' citation count. (P. 138, n.58.)
'0 Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 30 (U.K.).
" Id. at § 30(2)(a).
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if these conditions do not apply, V will remain in the class if she is unable to
communicate her competent choice to D.12 Unsurprisingly, Stanton-Ife takes the
view that this provision is likely to conflict with the best interests of mentally
disordered persons, a view which would, as Stanton-Ife demonstrates, be shared by
Williams. (Pp. 204-206.) Stanton-Ife's insightful and humane discussion of the
matters to be resolved when mapping, respectively, the zones of protection and
choice for the severely mentally disordered makes a strong case that the current
law unduly restricts sexual contact. Yet, because his philosophically informed
analysis is so sensitive to all the issues in play, it also demonstrates how difficult it
is to formulate a balanced yet forensically usable test for the minimum conditions
of consent on the part of persons whose lack of understanding of the nature of
sexual contact, and its consequences may be radical. (Pp. 225-229.)
The restrictive condition of English law on consent and mentally disordered
persons was influenced by the unreported trial case of Jenkins. (P. 207.) D, a care
worker in a residential accommodation for leaming disabled persons, had sexual
intercourse with V, a woman in his care, who had a mental age of three. D was
acquitted of rape on a jury direction that instructed that the arousal of "animal
instinct" could make for consent.1 3  While Stanton-Ife fully understands the
reasons for the adverse reaction to D's acquittal, he would not deny, even to
persons as learning disabled as V, the opportunity for sexual contact, though not,
of course, in circumstances of exploitation. Whether for persons such as V this can
be achieved by formulating a test that will reliably indicate when, in some tenable
usage of the word consent, there was indeed consent to some token of sexual
contact, is a considerable challenge.
B. Preventative Orders and the Rule of Law
Andrew Ashworth's chapter revisits an article of Williams' where he used his
critical skills on the continued misuse of the jurisdiction vested in criminal courts
in England and Wales to bind over a defendant, witness, or complainant in a
criminal case to keep the peace.' 4 The court must have reason to believe that the
person against whom the binding-over order is made may cause a breach of the
peace, unless constrained. In that case, it can order the person to pay over a sum of
12 Id. at § 30(2)(b).
13 Applying R v. Fletcher, (1859) Bell CC 63 (U.K.).
14 Glanville Williams, Preventative Justice and the Rule of Law, 16 M.L.R. 417 (1953). At
the time this article was published, a binding over order could oblige the subject to be of good
behavior and/or to keep the peace. The power to bind over to be of good behavior was found to be
too uncertain in scope to comply with Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights. Hashman v. U. K., 30 Eur. Ct. H. R. 241, 257 (1999). The origins ofthepower tobind
over are to be found in the common law and the Justices of the Peace Act 1361 and supplemented in various statutes
but principally the Magistrates' Court Act 1980. For further detail see Law Corn. No. 222, Criminal Law: Binding
Over (Cm 2439, London: HMSO, 1994) available at
https'/www.gov.uk/govemment/ploads/system/uploads/atachmient data/file271993/2439.pdf
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money (enter a recognizance) to be forfeited should he cause at some future time a
breach of the peace. Should the person subject to the order refuse to pay the sum
demanded, immediate imprisonment can follow, to a maximum of twelve months.
On revisiting Williams' critique of this ancient yet singular jurisdiction,
Ashworth finds more bad news than good news. Although Williams was not an
outright abolitionist of the power to bind over (he allowed a limited role in respect
of non-defendants), the power of his critique was in large part responsible for the
Law Commission for England and Wales concluding that binding over had no
place in a modem criminal justice system. (P. 46.) But the United Kingdom
Government was persuaded by criminal justice professionals that the power to bind
over was too useful, too time and cost effective, to be let go. Improvements were
made: when binding to keep the peace, the court must identify the behavior from
which D must refrain, and there are now rules on evidence, burden of proof, and
calculating the amount of the recognizance. (P. 47.) Yet, two of the most
fundamental rule-of-law objections that Williams raised are un-remedied. The
amount payable by way of recognizance may exceed the maximum fine for any
offence charged; English courts have managed to persuade themselves that this
may be a warranted response to persistent offending. (Pp. 64-65.) Most
dismaying of all is that imprisonment for up to twelve months continues to be the
sanction for refusing to be subject to an order, when the breach of the order leads
only to the forfeit of the payment on accepting the order. (Pp. 65-67.)
Milsom's pejorative phrase "medieval accidents" referenced earlier seems
particularly on point for a court order that goes back to the Justices of the Peace
Act 1361. But the idea of bypassing criminal trials by quick fix preventive orders
flourishes in contemporary England and Wales. The most wide-ranging of these
variations on a medieval theme is the anti-social behavior order [ASBO] 15. The
process starts with civil process; the court must be persuaded that D has acted in a
manner likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more other persons.
Whereupon, an order can be made (the ASBO) prohibiting D from doing anything
identified in the order for the next two years. None of the matters prohibited need
be a criminal offense. If the order is breached, that in itself is a criminal offense
punishable with a maximum of five years imprisonment. By this process conduct
which does not contravene the terms of any nominate offense is none the less a
crime. Should the terms of the order be breached by conduct that is criminal (say,
a minor assault of the kind that can only be tried summarily), the sentence handed
down is guided by the five year maximum rather than maximum penalty for
summary assault.
Ashworth's unanswerable critique of the ASBO and like orders (pp.57-62 and
references) is one of the salient reasons why, at the time of writing, they are under
legislative review.
15 ASBOs were introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37 (U.K.). At the time of
writing, these orders are under legislative review and the account of the law in the text may be
superseded by the time of publication.
2014]
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C. What is the General Part of the Criminal Law?
The preface to the second edition of Williams' Criminal Law: The General
Part opens as follows:
This book is concerned to search out the general rules of the
criminal law, i.e., those applying to more than one crime. The great
proliferation of criminal offences by the legislature means that many
crimes are not fully covered by judicial interpretation; but all are
governed by certain general principles, which are conveniently described
on the Continent as the "general part" of the law. By bringing together
the authorities on such concepts as knowledge, intent to defraud, and
claim of right, the root principles are thrown into relief, and the attention
of the practitioner is directed to relevant authorities that might be decided
under different statutes from the one with which he is immediately
concerned. 16
This passage, which is the totality of Williams' account of what the general
part consists of, offers no theory, nor even a description of the general part. To
make the badge of entry to the general part a rule that applies to more than one
offense will not do as a theory or description of the general part.' 7 It would be
heavy-handed, however, to subject to critique the contents of a preface. The point
of interest is that these cursory remarks, remaindered to a preface, demonstrate
Williams' lack of interest in theoretical discourse. Though not a theorist, Williams
was a jurisprudent,' 8 a perspicuous user of juristic concepts and categories, a
learning that inflected his work on substantive law. He created a general part for
England and Wales by virtue of writing about elements of the general part. 19 He
went straight in to doing that (chapter one is entitled, The Criminal Act) without
spending too much time pondering the content of his book.
Michael Moore's approach to scoping the content of the general part could
not be more different. His rich and layered theoretical essay on the "specialness"
of the general part concludes that Anglo-American criminal law's general part
consists of four theories of liability, each made up of the same four parts. (P. 92.)
By a process of generalization and abstraction of the grounds for liability for the
wrongs found in the special part (considered in more detail below), Moore distills
16 WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at v.
17 Michael Moore convincingly dismisses any attempt to fashion a general part by picking out
the general from the particular. (Pp. 69-71.)
18 See Peter Glazebrook. (Pp. 7-8.)
19 None of the twenty-three chapters seem awkwardly placed in a book about the general part.
Moore objects that the content is too heterogeneous to nest under a properly unified conception of the
general part. (P. 70.) It will be argued below that the general part is heterogeneous, and resists
capture under a unified theory of the general part, at least in England and Wales.
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the content of the general part, enabling the four parts of each of the four theories
to be displayed by way of a four square matrix. These are drawn up for the theory
of liability that leads to conviction as a principal offender for a completed crime,
and then for liability as a principal for an inchoate crime, moving on to liability as
an accomplice for completed and inchoate crimes, and finally, liability for
conspiracy. This last theory of liability allows coverage of a broader swathe of
conduct of an inchoate or complicitous kind than is allowed for by those forms of
liability in their own right. (Pp. 92-101.)
A content neutral scrutiny of the special part lays the ground for the general
part. For Moore, the general part is a descriptive theory of the special part. (P.
73.) The special part is studied in order to identify the patterns and forms of
liability for specific crimes. Once identified, they are subjected to generalization,
refinement and abstraction. As the special part is concerned with responsibility for
wrongs across multifarious forms of human conduct, the process of generalization
and abstraction engages with the grounds of moral responsibility for many
different kinds of prima-facie wrongdoing. When examined in the round, a lot of
common ground in the terms of responsibility for disparate wrongs is revealed,
from which an overarching theory of responsibility can be constructed. (P. 95.)
This overarching theory determines the content of the four theories of liability to
be found in general part. This theory of responsibility will not always correspond
with aspects of the special part; there will be some cases of criminal liability which
are unwarranted when tested against the grounds of liability and exemption
endorsed by the general part. If there is no good reason why these tokens of
liability should be non-compliant with the terms of liability prescribed by the
general part, then the general part, as an integral part of the criminal law, can be
deployed to review and revise aspects of the special part. (P. 80.)
When Moore's four part matrices are consulted, one finds a snug fit between
the conceptions of wrongdoing, culpability, justification and excuse derived from
retributivist theory and the content of his general part. His general part is not put
forward as a normative construct deduced from retributivism but is presented as
derived from theorizing the actual content of the special part. Focusing on
Moore's culpability requirements, for each of the four forms of liability, there must
be intent with respect to result elements of the actus reus, plus belief as to
circumstance elements, or knowledge of such elements, or belief of a risk of such
elements, or existence of a risk of such elements a reasonable person would have
known about. Moore allows that none of these forms of culpability is required for
"minor violations." It would seem that, for Moore, the thousands of strict liability
offenses to be found in state and federal criminal law come within the scope of
minor violations: "offences of strict liability are not real crimes." (P. 89.)
Accordingly, the thousands of crimes in the special part which dispense with proof
of any form of culpability are not, in substance, at variance with the insistence in
his version of the general part that requires some form of culpability as a condition
for criminal liability.
2014]
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In the case of England and Wales, bracketing strict liability as not really part
of the criminal law would be implausible. For that jurisdiction, Williams was
entirely correct to include a chapter on strict liability in his book on the general
part. 20 Even in the regulatory context, many strict liability offenses carry
sentences of imprisonment. Strict liability is not confined to the regulatory context
but has been used as the standard for very serious offenses, such as rape of a
child 21 and possession of a firearm.22 For the most common form of non-vehicular
homicide-unlawful act manslaughter-there is no culpability requirement, merely
a causal requirement, for the death element of the offense. There is a form of
vehicular homicide that is strict all the way down.24 Any survey of the criminal
law of England and Wales also has to include its terrorism legislation, now
voluminous and permanent. Liability for terrorism offenses can be incurred for
conduct so remote from terrorist acts that any talk of culpable wrongdoing
becomes extremely forced. On occasion, English law not only dispenses with
20 See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 215.
21 Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 5 (U.K.). In R v. G, [2008] UKHL 37 (appeal taken
from Eng.), the House of Lords confirmed a conviction for rape of a child against D, a fifteen year
old boy who reasonably believed V, his twelve year old girlfriend, to be fifteen.
22 Fire Arms Act, 1968, c. 27, §§ 1, 5 (U.K.) (as amended). In the conjoined appeal of R v.
Rehman, [2005] EWCA (Crim) 2056, [5], [21], [23] (Eng.), the two defendants who, in the words of
the court of appeal, were of "positively good character," appealed against sentences of five years
imprisonment for the strict liability offense of unlawful possession of a firearm, the minimum term
fixed by law. It was accepted for both defendants at trial that they had no unlawful intentions
regarding any use of the firearm possessed. Id. at [19], [28]. Rehman's sentence was reduced to one
year based on "exceptional circumstances," which displaced the minimum term, namely the fact that
he had good reason to think that the item possessed was not a firearm. Id. at [30]-[3 1]. Wood's five-
year sentence was upheld; he had taken possession of a sawn-off shotgun from his father, twenty-one
years previously, put it in his attic, and left it there. Id. at [25], [32].
23 There is a long-standing line of authority that the predicate offense need not, ex ante, give
rise to any discernible risk of serious harm. For a recent and striking example, see R v. JM, [2012]
EWCA (Crim) 2293 (Eng.).
24 Section 3ZB of the Road Traffic Act 1988 creates a homicide offense of causing death
while driving without a license, or while disqualified, or without insurance. All three predicate
offenses are offenses of strict liability; particularly in the matter of insurance cover, motorists may be
without coverage through no fault of their own and with no reason to be aware of the lack of
coverage. There need only be a causal connection between the driving and the death, a requirement,
until recently, given the widest interpretation. See G.R. Sullivan & A.P. Simester, Causation without
Limits: Causing Death While Driving Without a Licence, While Disqualified or Without Insurance,
2012 CRIM. L. REv. 753, 753 (2012). This offense was recently scrutinized by the Supreme Court
(UK) in R v. Hughes [2013] UKSC 56 [36] (appeal taken from Eng.), where it was ruled that the
driving had to be at fault if it was to be regarded as a cause of death, a ruling to some extent
welcome, but unsettling for standard causal doctrine. A.P. Simester & G. R. Sullivan, Causation as
Fault, 73 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 14, 14-15 (2014).
25 In Khan v. R, [2013] EWCA (Crim) 468, [48], [79], [90] (Eng.), and others, the court of
appeal handed down very long sentences to defendants for conduct which, with one exception, was
utterly remote from any act of terrorist violence. The one exception was downloading instructions
about pipe bombs. In R v. Gul, [2013] UKSC 64, [28]-[37], [61] (appeal taken from Eng.), the
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culpability but also with what should be the very foundation stone of any form of
criminal liability, namely some act, omission or state of affairs attributable to a
voluntary exercise of D's agency, or some voluntary omission on the part of D
which would have prevented the occurrence of the proscribed event or state of
affairs.26
One could go on in this vein, but instead, something will be said about
punishment for crimes in England and Wales. For Moore, a theory of the general
part does not include a theory of punishment as a theory of punishment goes to the
totality of the criminal law and not just to the general part. (P. 72.) Conceptually,
one can separate the conditions which justify in retributivist terms D's conviction
for an offense and thereby render him eligible for punishment, from what sanction
makes for a just punishment for the offense. Yet there would be a lack of
concordance at the level of the criminal law in its totality if the restraints of
retributive justice were scrupulously observed up to the point of conviction, and
then frequently discarded at the sentencing stage. For a retributivist tout court, that
would be half a loaf.27 In England, the aims of sentencing are set in statutory form
and consist of punishment, crime reduction, reform and rehabilitation, public
protection and reparation. 28  The legislation makes no attempt to reconcile the
irreconcilable by reference to any overarching purpose. This reflects the fact that
convictions and punishments unjustifiable in retributivist theory abound in
England and Wales. Any theory of the general part rendered in retributivist terms
for that jurisdiction must be by way of normative critique; it cannot be based on a
descriptive theory of the special part.
D. Justification and Excuse
For some considerable time, a number of Anglophone criminal law scholars
have been arguing the importance of the distinction between justification and
Supreme Court gave the widest interpretation possible for the meaning of terrorism in terrorist
legislation, a reading which encompasses persons of democratic aspirations using direct means to
oppose tyranny.
26 Section 441 of the Education Act, 1996, c. 56, § 441 (U.K.) makes it an offense to be a
parent of a child of compulsory school age who is not attending school regularly. There are
thousands of prosecutions for this offense each year, frequently involving convictions of blameless
parents made liable through the free agency of their teenage children. G.R. Sullivan, Parents and
Their Truanting Children: An English Lesson in Liability Without Responsibility, 12 OTAGO L. REV.
285, 287-88 (2010).
27 For "mixed" theorists such as H.L.A. Hart, half a loaf is all that is wanted. H.L.A. HART,
Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (1968); H.L.A. HART, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 158.
28 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 142 (U.K.). The mandatory life sentence for murder
and the provisions for passing sentences for public protection result in many sentences
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.
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excuse. In his vivid and illuminating revisitation of Lord Coleridge's judgment in
Dudley and Stephens,29 Joshua Dressier questions the convictions for murder and
ponders whether things might have turned out differently if the right question had
been asked. The question was not whether the killing of the cabin boy was
justified and to be endorsed as a guiding rule of conduct for persons unfortunate
enough to find themselves placed in similar circumstances. What should have
been the focus of attention of the court was the extremity of the circumstances.
Stoical resistance to the temptation to survive by way of killing an innocent non-
threatening person should draw unstinting praise. It does not follow that
succumbing to the temptation should attract unrelenting blame. The question that
should have been asked is whether the killing of the cabin boy was done with the
culpability warranting a conviction for murder. For Dressier, the answer for the
very dire circumstances of the case is no. Because the circumstances were so
extreme, even a deliberate killing driven by these exigencies and necessary for the
survival of the three defendants could be excused. (Pp. 139-145.)
Dressler references the criticisms made by Williams of the judgment of Lord
Coleridge and agrees with some of his points of detail. (P. 134.) But, for Dressier,
the secular-utilitarian reasoning that underpins Williams' conclusion that the
defendants should have been acquitted hits the wrong note. Killing the cabin boy
cannot be convincingly justified in consequentialist terms because the wrong
involved in killing an innocent person precludes for Kantian reasons any
consequentialist attempt to justify killing an innocent, non-threatening person.
Only an in-the-round moral appraisal informed by the difference between
justification and excuse can acknowledge the wrong, yet still withhold conviction
and punishment on the ground of attenuated culpability.
It is questionable, however, whether even deontologists who take the
justification/excuse distinction seriously will agree among themselves about the
decision in Dudley and Stephens. There are codes of morality that take an
intentional killing of an innocent, non-threatening person to be a moral wrong of
such gravity as to be inexcusable, let alone justifiable.3 0  And there will be
differences in the consequentialist camp. As Dressier notes, some rule-utilitarians
would advocate an intransigent law of murder as the most cost-effective way of
cutting the murder rate across the board, however harsh the verdicts in individual
cases. (P. 141.) Most act-utilitarians such as Williams would agree that the
decision was wrong, but some might disagree as to the details of the calculus and
29 R v. Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273 (U.K.).
30 In substance, this is the position taken by English law in its consistent refusal to allow the
defense of duress to murder. Although defense submissions have not made reference to scholarly
accounts of the excuse-justification distinction, the defense has long been characterized in England as
a "concession to human frailty." R v. Howe, [1987] 1 A.C. 417,432 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
See also R v. Hasan, [2005] 2 A.C. 467 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). But in cases where one
innocent life is pitted against another innocent life, a duty of self-sacrifice is a consistent theme in the
jurisprudence, whatever the weight of circumstances. The leading case is Howe, supra.
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think there was insufficient clarity about the benefits to be achieved to warrant a
disapplication of the law of murder at the time the killing was done. There is one
certainty though: Dudley & Stephens will be discussed in class for many decades
yet.
Paul Robinson marks the failure of Williams to heed the justification/excuse
distinction as one of the four distinctions that he failed to make in his examination
of the interrelation between criminal law doctrines.31 Robinson is perhaps the
leading advocate for the formal recognition of this distinction in the daily workings
of the criminal law. If D is excused for a wrong rather than found to have done the
right thing, the public terms of the acquittal should record that his conduct was
wrong, and breached the terms of the law, but not in circumstances requiring a
punitive response. (Pp. 110-13.) A public record sending this message might, for
instance, have diffused some of the public anger aroused by the acquittal of the
police officers responsible for the death of Rodney King. (P. 1 11.) An acquittal
on the grounds of excuse need not leave D unsupervised: the court should be given
jurisdiction to make D subject to orders in the interest of public safety when
necessary. Robinson's clear-cut take on justification/excuse divide would be
helpful in court room settings. For him, justification is based on the external facts.
If the container that D picked up contained a bomb due to explode on the crowded
beach, it does not matter if D thought he was making off with something of value
he could use or sell. If D's act is of beneficial impact in terms of the interests that
law exists to protect, then his act is justified whatever his motivation. Justified
conduct must be allowed its head: it cannot be interfered with, and third parties are
permitted to assist the justified actor in what would otherwise be criminal conduct.
There is no doubt that the justification/excuse divide is embedded in daily life.
Frequently, people say things like, "What can you expect? He's had such a hard
time recently. But I wish he had not done it," or "She refused to do it. Someone
needed to take a stand. I hope she keeps her job." But, employing the distinction
as a formal binary divide, to be used as a matter of record, will be difficult. Self-
defense is conceived of by many criminal law theorists as a quintessential
justification, but it has always contained an element of excusatory leeway: "A
person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his
necessary defensive action.)3 2 In a remarkable and lamentable recent legislative
change, English law now provides that a householder defending himself and others
in his household will be deemed to have exercised his statutory right to use "such
force as is reasonable in the circumstances '33 unless he used force that was
31 The other distinctions that, for Robinson, should have been made by Williams, were to
mark those defenses which exempt from liability where D satisfies the elements of the offense
definition, to mark the doctrines of imputation that impose liability on D when he does not satisfy all
the elements of the offense definition, and to distinguish between ex ante rules of conduct and ex post
rules of adjudication. (P. 109.)
32 Palmer v. R, [1971] 1 A.C. 814, 832 (P.C.) (Lord Morris) (appeal taken from Jam.).
33 Criminal Law Act, 1967, c. 58, § 3 (U.K.).
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"grossly disproportionate., 34  While ill-advised legislation can deem
disproportionate force short of grossly disproportionate force to be reasonable
force, no legal alchemy can make disproportionate force morally justified force. If
England and Wales were to adopt the qualified acquittal recommended by
Robinson, it would have the unenviable task of sorting acquittals based on self-
defense into those that were justified and those that were not, although all
acquittals on this ground would fall within the statutory terms of the defense.
Duress is conceived of as the quintessential excuse. Suppose D says to P (and
means what he says), "Tell me the code or I will shoot you." What P should be
permitted by law to do next depends very much on why D wants the code. If it is
entry into a nuclear facility, it might not be unreasonable to expect P to die at his
post. If it is the code for a bank safe, I, for one, would want P to return safely
home to his family, even at the expense of the bank. Should he be given some
lesser form of acquittal, indicative of a wish that he should do better next time?
It may be that these difficulties of application are not insurmountable. Yet
there are deeper issues regarding the very conception of a justification. D, a police
officer, receives in his earpiece a message from a superior that V, a person sitting
in a London tube train, is a terrorist with a concealed explosive device. V is no
such person, just a passenger. Yet, on the information D was given, and
considering his place in the police command structure, complying with the order to
shoot to kill V was his only operational option.35 Yet if it is claimed that D was
justified in shooting V, for Robinson it would follow that the innocent V can offer
no lawful resistance to being shot. This is one reason why Robinson would say
that D's killing of V can only be excused, whereas if it had turned out that V had
been able to save his life by killing D, that killing would have been justified
because the external facts were on V's side.
For George Fletcher, the scholar who did so much to bring the
excuse/justification distinction into Anglo-American criminal law scholarship, the
idea that all questions of intent and motivation should be stripped out of the
question of whether D was justified is a "heresy. 3 6 The best reason for following
Robinson is that, by allowing the external facts to do the talking, there is an
economical method of sorting out definitively, who is justified and who is excused.
In the case of the tube train shooting, the officer must look to be excused not
34 Crime and Courts Act, 2013, c. 22, § 43 (U.K.).
35 The description of the tube train shooting is based on the police account of why the
innocent Jean Charles de Menezes was killed by police fire. See Jenny Percival, Orders Given to
Police Who Shot Jean Charles de Menezes Were 'Ambiguous', THEGUARDIAN, (Nov. 5, 2008, 7:28
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/nov/05/de-menezes-pathologist-inquest. There have been no
criminal proceedings against the instructing officer or the officer who shot de Menezes. Id The police
account is disputed by the family and supporters of the innocent man. See Transcript, DeMenezes Inquest
(October 20, 2008), available at http://wwwjulyseventh.co.uk/j7-jean-charles-de-menezes-inquest/de-
menezes-inquest-transcripts/oct_20.pdf.
36 It seems that Fletcher thought Robinson sent Williams on the wrong path in this matter
when Robinson studied at Cambridge, but it seems Williams got there by himself. (Pp. 40-42.)
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justified, and the innocent V retained all his rights, although in practical terms he
was not able to exercise them. For Robinson, to claim that the officer was justified
in shooting the innocent man, and that, had he had the means and opportunity, the
innocent man could have defended himself against justified force, is muddle-
headed. But is it not the case that police officers should do what is presumptively
the right thing if on the best risk assessment available it seemed the right thing? A
legal system may wish to give its officials this degree of latitude, but not at the
expense of denying innocent persons the right to defend themselves. A finding
that each party to a bilateral shoot-out was justified, is not a logical contradiction
and may make for better if more complicated justice than Robinson's fact of the
matter conception ofjustification.
E. Culpability
Williams took a subjectivist approach to mens rea, believing that, in the main,
the culpability for offenses should be expressed in terms of intention, knowledge,
recklessness, and the like. Usually, this is a fairly reliable indicator of a person
with retributivist leanings, but not in the case of Williams. As a thorough-going
utilitarian, he had no time for retribution. He, of course, allowed punishment for
the sake of deterrence but was no zealot; regarding belief in the threat of
punishment as an influence on human conduct as "a matter of faith rather than of
proved scientific fact.",37 He was very skeptical about the deterrent effect of laws
punishing tokens of negligent conduct: "there is no department in which this faith
is less firmly grounded than that of negligence." 
38
Andrew Simester believes that the criminal punishment of some tokens of
negligence is morally warranted. For Simester, the punishment of negligent
conduct cannot be squared with standard versions of choice theory and capacity
theory. The accommodation of negligence as a form of culpability requires, in his
words, "a disintegrated theory of culpability." An example he gives of D, left in
charge of a young child on a beach, who fails to prevent the child from drowning
because he is giving all his attention to a radio broadcast, makes a strong intuitive
case for criminal liability and punishment. (P. 194.) The case would be even
stronger if D had seen the child was in difficulty but chose to keep listening. But
the case is strong as it stands even though it would be a stretch to say that it was
his choice to allow the child to die.
The most obvious theory supportive of the punishment of D would be H.L.A.
Hart's capacity theory, which supplements choice theory. One would ask whether
D was a person with normal mental and physical capacities. Then one would ask
whether a reasonable person with normal capacities would have kept an eye on the
child. For Simester, this is not enough, as "it fails to demonstrate in positive terms
37 WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 122.
38 Id.
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why negligence can be a ground of culpability." (P. 185.) He finds what is needed
in what he terms a (thin) moral character flaw theory. (P. 193.) It is thin in the
sense that it does not rest on any in-depth, time-expansive examination of the
character of D. Just as with choice and capacity theory, the culpability arises from
an episode of conduct. What is required is that, during that episode, D was not
merely inadvertent when he had the capacity to pay attention, but that his failure to
do so reflects badly on his character-shows him to be a person with wrong values.
Simester demonstrates very well why negligent conduct taken as a category
encompasses disparate forms of failure. Even the grossest episodes of negligence
may not evince the kind of moral gravity a serious criminal offense arguably
should require. D may be the anesthetist from Hell, but his shortcomings may be a
tendency to panic and a woefully limited skill set, rather than a callous indifference
to the interests of the patient.39 Though the stakes may be lower, the father who
gets engrossed in playing poker, forgetting that it is his turn to pick up his young
daughter from school, arguably has a more deficient character. The self-preference
of some agents is rooted and constant. Their neglect of the most basic
responsibilities constitutes a threat to their families and associates. Simester's
careful and nuanced arguments convince that certain tokens of inattention arising
from self-absorption can be a reliable indicator of bad character. The next
challenge, which lies beyond the scope of his essay, is to nail down this form of
culpability in terms usable by prosecutors and courts.
Although Williams favored culpability of a subjective kind, he did not
concern himself with the question of how many forms of subjective culpability are
needed. For Williams, recklessness consisted of the conscious taking of an
unwarranted risk of infringing the legally protected interests of others. This
conception of recklessness is reestablished in England.4° As the entry level form
of culpability for serious criminal offenses, recklessness in terms of foresight has a
lot to commend it. If D, without a good reason, sets fire to an occupied house in
the early hours, aware of the grave danger she will create for the sleeping
occupants, clearly she is in the red-zone. If, as in Hyam,41 the fire proves fatal for
two sleeping children, some form of homicide conviction is inevitable. Why did
she set fire to the house? If she did so in order to kill, then murder. The
prosecution accepted that her motivation was to frighten, so arguably then, a case
of reckless manslaughter. However, a murder verdict was handed down by the
39 In the leading English case on gross negligence manslaughter, the defendant, an anesthetist,
failed to detect a loose connection and spent several frantic minutes looking for the source of the
problem. Evidence was given that a competent anesthetist would have fixed the problem within
fifteen seconds. Yet he was doing his best. Ensuring that he never set foot in an operating theatre
again might have been a better way of dealing with this, rather than sending him to prison for 5 years.
R v. Adomako, [1995] 1 A.C. 171, 181-82 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
40 For a time, the failure to think about an obvious risk was accepted as an objective
supplement to subjective recklessness, but it has now been dropped. R v. G, [2003] UKHL 50, 4 All
ER 765, 766 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
41 Hyam v. DPP, [1975] 1 A.C. 55, 55 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
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House of Lords on the basis that foresight of the probability of causing death or
serious bodily harm was tantamount to an intention to cause death or serious
bodily harm. This started a debate about the meaning of intent in the context of
murder, which required three more visits to the House of Lords to resolve.
Williams accepted the terms of this debate without raising the question of
whether it was worth having. There is a powerful argument that a unified form of
culpability applicable for all serious offenses should be in terms of subjective
recklessness. 42 Williams accepted as a given that certain crimes required proof of
intent without querying whether this was useful, which given his utilitarian
disposition, is strange. As for Williams' take on intent, in addition to intent in the
form of the motivating factors explaining why D did what he did, Williams firmly
endorsed the view that any side-effects which D foresaw as virtually certain to be
caused by his conduct were outcomes that he intended. Following Bentham, he
termed the latter form of intent, "oblique intent," and, like Bentham, did not
consider there to be any difference of substance between the two forms of intent.
In his excellent chapter, which revisits the academic and judicial disputes
concerning the meaning of intent (including whether the search for its meaning is a
hopeless quest), Antony Duff notes that Williams does concede that sometimes
oblique intent may not suffice, and that it might be legitimate for a court to insist D
must have intent in the full sense of acting in order to bring about the actus reus of
the offense charged. Williams mentions offenses of causing mental stress,
complicity, and treason. (Pp. 151-52.) As Duff notes, this is a surprising
concession, given the firmness of his opinion that oblique intent is real intent and
not some ersatz version. Williams does not say why he allows this possibility,
which even for a scholar so averse to theory for theory's sake, is economical.
Duff, in a persuasive account, suggests that an explanation for Williams'
concessions (not necessarily the explanation Williams would have given), lies in
settling the limits of our responsibilities as conceived under law. (Pp. 169-77.)
While, for Duff, there is always responsibility for harms that are directly intended,
there are occasions where, in his words, we need not pay "practical attention" to
harms we know we will bring about but do not directly intend. Duff's discussion
of this responsibility issue has great import for one of Williams' concessions in
particular, conduct which causes mental stress. In England, psychiatric injury is
now regarded as a form of bodily harm for the purposes of the offenses of
maliciously inflicting wounds or bodily harm,43 and for the more serious offense of
wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily
harm.44 When extending these offenses to psychiatric injuries, the need for any
42 LARRY ALEXANDER, KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, WITH STEPHEN MORSE, CRIME AND
CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 27-29 (2009).
43 Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, § 20 (U.K.).
44 Id. at § 18.
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form of assault and/or percussive force was dropped; neither of these offenses
requires anything other than causation with respect to the actus reus.
45
In theory, including psychiatric injury within the terms of these offenses could
open up new vistas of liability beyond the harassment cases (incessant silent phone
calls, abusive mail, stalking) that prompted this accommodation of psychiatric
injury within violent offenses against the person. Suppose D is refereeing a paper
written by V for an academic journal. He knows that acceptance of the paper is
crucial for V's chances of tenure and knows that V has fragile mental health and
may well suffer a breakdown if his post is unconfirmed. D considers the paper to
be publishable, but, as he intensely dislikes V and wishes to do him down, he
recommends non-publication and no chance of resubmission. In consequence, V's
post is unconfirmed and V becomes acutely depressed as D had hoped he would.
For various reasons, a prosecution would be unlikely, but a prosecution would be
morally justified and, as the law stands now in England, legally feasible. Now,
hold everything else constant but make the paper a poor paper, and allow that D is
able to land his psychological blow by way of a warranted academic judgment.
Arguably there is no crime on the part of D in the second scenario even if a
direct intent to cause mental stress could be proved. If D would have not reviewed
V's paper but for the chance to cause him harm, then he reviewed the paper in
order to do him harm, even in the case where that was achievable by way of an
informed and balanced appraisal. Duff s argument based on responsibility carries
further than cases of oblique intent. There will arise many occasions where harm
can be caused with impunity even with direct intention by, as it were, playing it by
the book. D can open a competing store near to V's store, knowing that his
resources and business acumen will bring him profits and cause the collapse of V's
business. He is doing this because he wants to make money and to harm V. In the
eye of the law, D will be running a lawful business and need not concern himself
with the harm his success will cause to his competitors.46
II. THE SANCTITY OF LIFE
In 1957, Williams published The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, a
book on the reform of English Law in the fields of suicide, assisted suicide,
euthanasia and abortion. The book was one of the influences on the
decriminalization of attempted suicide in England, a change in the law now
regarded as uncontroversial by persons of all shades of opinion regarding questions
about the meaning and the legal implications of the phrase "the sanctity of life."
Williams wanted more than decriminalization: he wanted what some would now
call a right to self-determination, a right that could be accessed, should
circumstances require, through the assistance of others, whether by means of
45 R v. Ireland, [1998] 1 A.C. 147, 147, 151, 159 (appeal taken from Eng.).
46 See G.R. Sullivan, Bad Thoughts and BadActs, 1990 CRIM. L. REV. 559 (1990).
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assistance in the process of committing suicide or by way of what he called
"consensual homicide." The proposal is so broad that it continues to startle some
fifty seven years after it was made. Providers of assistance in suicide or
perpetrators of consensual homicide are not confined to the medical profession.
No procedures are laid down. There is no reason whatever to think that his
advocacy of this change was in any way flippant or designed to shock. It is made
as a short postscript to a chapter where a careful, prudential and compassionate
case is made for not prosecuting persons who have attempted suicide-something
that was more or less settled practice at the time he was writing. As John Keown
observes in his chapter, Williams versus Kamisar on Euthanasia, Williams
recognized that public opinion was not ready for something so radical. (P. 253.)
Williams concluded his chapter with a more limited proposal to permit doctors to
perform voluntary euthanasia to end severe pain in cases of terminal illness.
Keown's revisitation of the debate between Yale Kamisar and Williams
provides a convincing refutation of Williams' claim that his more limited proposal
was safe from expansion by way of the slippery slope. Kamisar, writing from a
secular-liberal perspective, makes a convincing case that allowing doctors the
authority to perform euthanasia, in the circumstances of even Williams' more
modest proposal, could soon expand in practice to cover terminations where the
voluntariness of the patient's involvement would be open to serious question, an
estimation vindicated by developments in various countries and a story still
unfolding. Williams' engagement with Kamisar on this issue is unconvincing and
not reminiscent of the combat effective Williams, familiar from his frequent
engagements with adversaries on points of doctrine. Keown's verdict that, during
this exchange with Kamisar, "his scholarly standards slipped, sometimes
precipitously" (P. 273) is severe, but justified.
Why was this? Arguably, Williams was not fully engaged by the debate. In
his un-nuanced, utilitarian way, Williams was convinced that the sum of human
happiness would be increased if persons who no longer valued their lives were
allowed to surrender their lives. Although he acknowledged that young persons in
particular might make impetuous decisions, destructive of their potentially
valuable lives and the happiness of their parents, as Keown observes, he made no
searching examination of whether easy access to medically administered death
would, even from a utilitarian perspective, do more harm than good. (P. 251.) His
defense against the slippery slope was a half-hearted response to what he saw as
cautious, conventional opinion, a response tactically necessary at the time but not,
perhaps, in the future.
Williams was prominent in associations formed to advocate legislative reform
allowing abortion and euthanasia. Pending legislative changes, he had hopes that
some progress might be made judicially by developing the defense of necessity. In
her informative chapter, Penney Lewis shows that, save for the complex exception
of Holland, attempts by courts to give more scope to doctors in the matter of
assisted dying, have foundered on a lack of judicial consensus and an
understandable reluctance to step forward where the legislature has been reticent.
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Confining attention to Europe, two countries in particular, Switzerland and
Belgium, have legislated to give doctors great latitude in assisting death. The same
applies in Holland through a combination of the necessity defense,
pronouncements by medical bodies, governmental statements, and legislation.
These developments have had a great effect on opinion and practice in the
United Kingdom. Williams' reform strategy was gradualist; he hoped that through
debate and the powers of persuasion, older ways of thinking based on religion and
custom could, over time, be changed for the better, from his perspective. The
pressure for change now comes from individuals, many in desperate straits, who
want change here and now. They are insisting that they have a human right to live
in a dignified way, in circumstances not amounting to inhuman and degrading
treatment, and that if their condition cannot be improved, they should be assisted in
dying and/or be informed ex ante what measures of assistance in dying, taken by
doctors, family and friends, would be likely to attract prosecution.4 7
Antje Du Bois Pedain, in her subtle probing of the legal possibilities arising
out of the duty-governed relationship of doctor and patient, is alive to the wishes of
patients to be ministered by their own doctors in ways that might accommodate a
supervised and dignified death. The formal law of England and Wales, which
proscribes any and all forms of assistance in suicide, let alone voluntary
euthanasia, remains stringent and clear.4 8 Yet the compassionate concern for
individuals placed in dire circumstances which animates Pedain's chapter is to be
found in the judgments in the recent Supreme Court (U.K.) decision in
Nicklinson.49
The three applicants in Nicklinson each suffered complete paralysis entailing
total dependence on others for all needs. They were incapable of taking their own
lives unassisted. Denial of medical help in committing suicide for persons in the
helpless condition of the applicants was found by Baroness Hale and Lord Kerr to
47 The terms of the legal debate in the matter of life/death decision-making changed with the
incorporation of the European Convention for Human Rights into United Kingdom law, following the
Human Rights Act 1998. The articles of the European Convention that are in play in the leading
cases of R (Pretty) v. DPP, [2002] 1 A.C. 800 (H.L.), R (Purdy) v. DPP, [2010] 1 A.C. 345 (H.L.)
and R (Nicklinson) v. Ministry of Justice, [2014] UKSC 38 (appeal from Eng. & Wales), are: Article
2 (right to life); Article 3 (inhuman and degrading treatment); Article 8 (right to private and family
life); and Article 14 (nondiscrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights and freedoms). Under
the terms of the 1998 Act, the common law must be made compatible with Convention rights and
legislation must be interpreted, "so far as is possible . . . in a way which is compatible with
Convention rights." Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3(1) (U.K.). If it is not possible to interpret a
legislative provision in a manner compatible with Convention rights, the court must make a
"declaration of incompatibility" which places a legal onus on the relevant government department to
consider changes to the legislation. Id. at § 4. However the government is not obliged under
domestic law to make any change. Id. at § 4(6)(b).
48 The common law of murder allows no leeway to euthanasia and the terms of the Suicide
Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 60, § 2 (U.K.) clearly proscribe encouragement or assistance of suicide
in all circumstances. Id.
49 [2014] UKSC 38.
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be in breach of Article 8 (1) of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights. Lord Neuberger and Lord Wilson were strongly inclined to that
conclusion but considered the time was not yet ripe for a definitive ruling.50 Lord
Mance was prepared to contemplate the possibility that s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961
was not Convention compliant but considered that parliament was much the best
forum to discuss and implement any change in the law. Lord Clarke and Lord
Sumption did not rule out any future application to the courts but only if
parliament failed to debate the issues arising in Nicklinson.51 Lord Reed and Lord
Hughes saw no role for the courts in the matter of assessing the legitimacy of
relaxing the current restraints on assistance in dying.
During the hearing of Nicklinson, the Director of Public Prosecutions let it be
known in open court that personal caregivers who arranged for and medical
professionals who provided assistance in suicide for persons in like circumstances
to the applicants were "most unlikely" to be prosecuted. 52 What changes, if any,
will be made to the written law of England and Wales relating to assisting suicide
is still an open question, but the law in action is now much closer to what Williams
wanted.
53
50 What the four judgments have in common is a conclusion that that the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights regarding Article 8(1) establishes that the right to respect for
private and family life includes a liberty to commit suicide, a liberty that should be available to
persons incapable of dying without assistance. The terms of s. 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 proscribe all
forms of assistance in suicide and therefore cannot be reconciled with this liberty. Lords Neuberger
and Wilson stayed their hands in the matter of issuing a declaration of incompatibility because
parliament was on the point of debating a bill concerned with assistance in dying. They indicated
that the courts would be open to future applicants in like case to the current applicants if parliament
declined to make any exceptions to the general proscription on assisting suicide.
51 The Assisted Dying Bill, which at the time of writing is before parliament deals with
patients who are terminally ill and would not cover any of the applicants in Nicklinson. Assisted
Dying bill, 2014-15, H.L. Bill [6] (Eng.) (Wales). Of course, the terms of the Bill may alter during
the legislative process.
52 [2014] UKSC 38 at [254]. The Director of Public Prosecutions must give consent to any
device. Purdy, supra note 47. The House of Lords ruled that Article 8(1) of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights required the Director to make and publish guidelines,
listing those factors which would favour or militate against the prosecution of the offence of assisting
and encouraging suicide. The guidelines subsequently published were equivocal about prosecutions
against medical professionals who provided assistance in suicide. All of the justices in Nicklinson
save for Lord Hughes and Lord Reed anticipated that the Director would amend the guidelines to
align them with her policy as stated to the court but refrained from making any order to that effect.
Of 85 cases referred to the Crown Prosecution Service between 1 April 2009 and 1 October 2013,
one referral resulted in a successful prosecution, sixty four were not proceeded with, eleven were
withdrawn and nine were on-going at the time of the hearing in Nicklinson. [2014] UKSC 38 at
[173].
53 Williams would have allowed voluntary euthanasia in addition to assistance in suicide.
There is little discussion in Nicklinson of the fine lines that may be involved when assessing whether
a particular procedure employed to end the life of a person incapable of taking his or her own life
unaided is assistance in suicide or euthanasia/mercy killing. In doctrinal terms, the English law of
murder does not permit or even mitigate the latter form of intervention: the mandatory life sentence
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III. PROFESSING THE CRIMINAL LAW
Tony Smith's concluding chapter looks at the things that Williams did as a
law professor-a professor who at the time that Smith was his colleague, was
primarily a professor of criminal law. This reflective and insightful chapter
stimulates thoughts about what criminal law professors should do today, and to
what extent they should try to emulate Williams, insofar as their capacities allow.
Above all, Williams wanted to improve the condition of the criminal law for
England and Wales. Aside from his students, he addressed himself to advocates,
judges, law reform bodies, legislators and civil servants, and, to an extent, the
general public. Although a law professorship was the right job for Williams, it is
likely that if his thoughts had not carried beyond the class room and the law
journals, he would have done something else. He sought to assist and goad the
passing of clearly expressed and consistent legislation and the creation of
examined and coherent doctrine. Though learned outside the law, his scholarship
was predominantly within the law, in terms of what was to be studied and
explicated. The letter of the law was what mattered. Though well known as a
utilitarian, there is next to no philosophical theorizing in a utilitarian vein in his
work.
Many contemporary scholars of the criminal law would not want to confine
themselves to doctrinal scholarship. For those of a critical or post-modern
persuasion, the letter of the law is by no means the last word on how cases are
decided. And from time to time they are given fish to fry. English appellate
criminal courts, for all their talk of strict construction, are prone to disrupt the
clearest legislation and most settled doctrine if bad persons are about to escape
justice by being charged with the wrong offense 54 or by some shortfall in the scope
of the offense charged. 5 Sir Roger Toulson, in incisive and measured terms,
demonstrates how the predictable and stable doctrine relating to the application of
the joint enterprise doctrine in murder cases (a doctrine which limited convictions
to manslaughter when a culpability approximate to the culpability of a perpetrator
applies. Nicklinson is a case about assisted suicide. Lord Neuberger made reference to a device that
is loaded with a lethal drug which can be self-administered via an eye blink computer by using a pass
phrase. Id. at [4]. He considered that resort to such a device would be a case of suicide. Id. at [92]-
[95]. This was also the opinion of Lady Hale. Id. at [318]. Lord Sumption thought there was no
difference in moral substance between the use of such devices and direct administration of the lethal
drug. Id. at [227]. This view was also expressed in forceful terms by Lord Kerr. Id. at [358]-[360].
54 For instance, the House of Lords, by a majority in DPP v. Gomez, [1993] 1 A.C. 442 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.), confirmed a conviction for theft on facts where it was obvious that the
charge should have been obtaining property by deception, thereby distorting the clear terms of section
I of the Theft Act of 1968. The dissenting opinions are doctrinally compelling.
" In R v. Hinks, [2001] 2 A.C. 241 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.), the House of Lords
confirmed a conviction for theft where D received gifts of money from V in circumstances where she
obtained a valid title to the money. This was no barrier to the confirmation of the conviction as,
apparently, the criminal law has its own conception of property, which may differ from the civil law.
The dissenting opinions are wholly convincing.
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could not be proved against a particular defendant), was incrementally changed in
a series of cases to allow murder verdicts on a wider basis. Sir Roger, it is
surmised, would fight bad doctrine with better doctrine, but would not venture out
of the doctrinal domain in arguing the case for doing so, as would also have been
the case with Williams. By contrast, a critical theorist would likely argue that any
change would not hinge on doctrinal argument, but would happen only if the
underlying social and political circumstances favored a reversion to the more
measured approach. At the other end of the spectrum from the critical theorists,
retributivist theorists would insist, before advocating any change in doctrine, that
there should be a theorized account of why the old doctrine was morally good, if it
turns out on deep reflection, to be morally good, and why the current doctrine is
morally bad if it turns out to be morally bad. Only then are you ready to advocate
particular doctrinal changes if minded to do so.
Critical theorists and retributivist criminal law theorists are here to stay in
Anglo-American law schools and so too other theorists of different stripes. In
England, non-theoretical doctrinalists are getting thinner on the ground, and tend to
be of a certain age. As the career of Glanville Williams demonstrates, doctrinal
scholarship of the highest order can make a difference to adjudication, and the
form and content of legislation, and is more likely to make a difference in these
spheres than other forms of legal scholarship. And lesser doctrinal scholars than
Williams can make their mark in this way, too. And for law schools, with their
distinctive features and various roles, that should matter. The very best legal
scholarship offers far more than doctrinal scholarship. Works like The Concept of
Law and Law's Empire are read from cover to cover. The fate of large doctrinal
works, however expert and well written, is to be consulted. Yet doctrinal
scholarship should have its place in the sun in modem law schools, alongside
everything else.
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